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RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION, RELIGIOUS TRADITION,
AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION
by
Marc O. DeGirolami*
A religious accommodation is an exemption from compliance with the
law for some but not for others. One might therefore suppose that before
granting an accommodation, courts would inquire about whether a legal
interference with religious belief or practice is truly significant, if only to
evaluate whether the risk of political polarization that attends accommodation is worth hazarding. But that is not the case: any assessment of the
significance of a religious belief or practice within a claimant’s belief system is strictly forbidden.
Two arguments are pressed in support of this view: (1) courts have institutional reasons for acquiescing on the burden question; and (2) courts
have anti-establishment reasons for doing so. Courts, it is said, do not
decide about the quality of religious burdens. Claimants do that. Courts
defer so as to reduce the political polarization that might result if some
should perceive that their religious beliefs and practices are comparatively
powerless to obtain exemptions. Deference on the burden question preserves the religious neutrality of courts and mitigates the politically polarizing dangers of accommodation.
This Essay contests that view. It argues that this approach to religious
accommodation has generated considerable difficulties of its own that
have aggravated the political polarization they were intended to reduce.
Political polarization is now a pervasive feature of religious accommodation, but this Essay focuses on only some explanations for this unfortunate state of affairs—those that relate to the antagonistic relationship between religious accommodation and established religious groups and
traditions.
First, hyper-deference as to the burden on religion systematically undermines the view that religions are institutional phenomena with established, stable, and longstanding traditions. In doing so, it damages the
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argument that courts are institutionally incompetent to evaluate religious ideas. Claims about the institutional incompetence of the judiciary
to inquire into religious burdens proceed on the assumption that there is
something unique—and intelligibly unique—about religious beliefs and
practices that make them different from, say, individual foibles, fraudulent schemes, flights of fancy, or private predilections. Arguments about
the judiciary’s institutional incompetence as to religious questions contemplate the existence of other institutions that are competent as to those
questions. Lacking such other institutions, the institutional competence
of courts to evaluate religious claims is greatly strengthened. Courts are
perfectly competent to evaluate fraud, idiosyncrasy, gibberish, and personal preference. Yet when courts are disabled from evaluating some varieties of idiosyncratic eccentricity (denominated “religious”) but not others (not so denominated), then “religion,” and therefore religious
accommodation, is bound to be politically polarizing. The category of religion, having been stripped of its institutional character for legal purposes, designates nothing coherent at all. And people begin to suspect
with some justice that decisions about accommodation are being made on
the basis of other reasons altogether.
Second, the hyper-deferential approach to religious accommodation assumes and promotes a particular and decidedly non-neutral view of religion as irrational and utterly incomprehensible to anybody other than an
individual believer. Accommodation is not for established religious
groups or traditions—groups that are organized, enduring, and that
might offer substantial resistance to prevailing political and cultural orthodoxies. Accommodation is for the exotic, the personal, the unthreatening, and the peculiar. That view is part of the heritage of the highly individualized, subjective approach to religion steadily constitutionalized
by the Supreme Court since the mid-twentieth century, and that now
seems to be the foundation of one powerful strain of the contemporary
cultural understanding of religion in America. It is a view whose promotion in law has profoundly entangled the state with religion. The refusal
of courts to make any serious inquiry into the nature of the asserted religious burden has encouraged increasingly aggressive, self-indulgent, and
ephemeral assertions of religious freedom. It will—and indeed, it already
has—promoted unserious religion. Small wonder that religion as a legal
category is in such disreputable odor. Small wonder that religious accommodation is increasingly perceived in politically partisan terms.
Introduction ....................................................................................... 1129
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Deference on the Burden Question ..................................... 1133
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has inherited a long legal and political tradition of
accommodating people from laws that impose burdens on religion. At
1
some points, that tradition has enjoyed federal constitutional status. At
2
present, it does not. Religious accommodation is instead generally required (when it is required) either by sundry federal and state statutes or
3
by state constitutional law. And in still other cases, religious accommodation has simply been seen as a beneficently tolerant policy or the wisest
practical course under the particular circumstances of religious pluralism
in this country.
Yet in all cases of religious accommodation, the threshold question
concerns the nature of the imposition on religious exercise. That is because in the absence of countervailing factors, the law should apply with
4
equal force and to everybody. When it applies selectively, the law’s authority is compromised in at least two ways. First, the law’s unequal application gives rise to the perception that the people who have to obey the
law occupy a less favored position than the people who do not. That perceived unfairness in the law may damage its authority. Second, the law’s
own moral and political message may be diluted or perhaps even cheapened inasmuch as its authority extends only as far as the nonaccommodated. Both of these consequences relate to the partiality of religious accommodation. Both can contribute to the perception that religious accommodation is one of the spoils of political influence. Both can
therefore lead to political polarization, which here refers broadly to the
increasing sense that decisions about religious accommodation depend
on the perceived political, cultural, or ideological leanings of those requesting them.
One might in consequence expect that, before granting a religious
accommodation, it would logically and rather obviously be necessary to
inquire about precisely how the law interferes with a claimant’s system of
religious belief and practice. That interference ought to be ample indeed
to hazard the risk of political polarization that attends accommodation;

1

E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
3
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012),
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2012), the sundry state RFRAs, and state constitutional law. In general, references to
“RFRA” in this Essay are to the 1993 federal act rather than to any state law patterned,
in whole or in part, after the federal act.
4
I view accommodations as exceptions from the law rather than a part of the law
itself, recognizing that some may contest that description and believe that
accommodations are themselves part of the law. At any rate, if the law applies with
full force to some and only partial (or no) force to others, it does not apply equally to
everyone.
2
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claimants ought to be able clearly to show and explain the interference.
And yet one of the most vexed issues in the law of religious accommodation concerns not merely the nature of a “substantial burden” on religious exercise but even the propriety of any legal inquiry about religious
burdens at all. Any assessment of the importance or centrality of a religious belief or practice within the claimant’s belief system is strictly forbidden:
It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the “centrality” of
religious beliefs before applying a “compelling interest” test in the
free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the “importance” of ideas before applying the “compelling interest” test in
the free speech field. What principle of law or logic can be brought
to bear to contradict a believer’s assertion that a particular act is
“central” to his personal faith? . . . Repeatedly and in many different
contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility
5
of a religious claim.

Two arguments are generally pressed in support of this view, both of
which reflect courts’ interests in maintaining neutrality as to religion, or
at least its veneer:
• Courts have “institutional” reasons for acquiescing in religious
claimants’ understandings of the nature of a law’s burden;
• Courts have anti-establishment reasons for doing so.
The two arguments are connected inasmuch as the more deeply a court
burrows into the quality of the imposition, the more probably it will
breach epistemological substrata out of its depth, and the less likely that
it can avoid entangling itself with religious affairs. Courts, it is said, do
not decide about the quality of religious burdens; they do not opine on
religious questions at all. Claimants do that. Both arguments thus serve
the function of deflecting suspicion that decisions about religious accommodation are ultimately non-neutral or a matter of political influence or preference.
Courts, in sum, defer on the question of the burden. They defer to
the individual claimant. They defer at least in part to reduce the political
polarization that might result if some groups or individuals—particularly
religious minorities or members thereof—should perceive that their religious beliefs and practices are comparatively powerless to obtain exemp6
tions. Deference on the burden question has been the preferred strategy
to preserve the neutrality of courts when it comes to religion and to mitigate the politically polarizing dangers of religious accommodation. Deference reconciles religious accommodation and religious pluralism.

5
6

Smith, 494 U.S. at 886–87.
See infra Part I.
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This Essay will contest that view. It will argue that this approach to religious accommodation has generated considerable difficulties of its own
that unfortunately have aggravated the political polarization they were
intended to reduce. For a variety of reasons, political polarization is now
a pervasive feature of religious accommodation. This Essay focuses on only some of those reasons—those that relate to the antagonistic relationship between religious accommodation (and specifically the hyperdeference accorded to claimants on the burden question) and established religious groups and traditions.
First, hyper-deference as to the burden on religion systematically
undermines the view that religions are institutional phenomena with established, stable, and longstanding traditions. In doing so, it damages the
argument that courts are institutionally incompetent to evaluate religious
ideas. Claims about the institutional incompetence of the judiciary to inquire into religious burdens proceed on the assumption that there is
something unique—and intelligibly unique—about religious beliefs and
practices that make them different from, say, individual foibles, fraudulent schemes, flights of fancy, or private predilections. Arguments about
the judiciary’s institutional incompetence as to religious questions contemplate the existence of other institutions that are competent as to those
questions. Lacking such other institutions, the institutional competence
of courts to evaluate religious claims is greatly strengthened. Courts are
perfectly competent to evaluate fraud, idiosyncrasy, gibberish, and personal preference. Yet when courts are disabled from evaluating some varieties of idiosyncratic eccentricity (denominated “religious”) but not
others (not so denominated), then “religion,” and therefore religious accommodation, is bound to be politically polarizing. The category of religion, having been stripped of its institutional character for legal purposes, designates nothing uniform at all. And people begin to suspect with
some justice that decisions about whether to accommodate or not are being made on the basis of other, unstated reasons altogether.
Second, the hyper-deferential approach to religious accommodation
assumes and promotes a particular and decidedly non-neutral view of religion as irrational and utterly incomprehensible to anybody other than
an individual believer. Accommodation is not for established religious
groups or traditions—groups that are organized, enduring, and that
might offer substantial resistance to prevailing political and cultural orthodoxies. Accommodation is for the exotic, the personal, the peculiar,
and (especially) the unthreatening. That view is part of the heritage of
7
the highly individualized, subjective approach to religion that was given

7

Marc O. DeGirolami, Virtue, Freedom, and the First Amendment, 91 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1465, 1504 (2016).
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8

perhaps its most eloquent exposition in the writing of William James,
was subsequently constitutionalized in mid-twentieth-century Supreme
9
Court case law, and now seems to be the foundation of at least one powerful strain of the contemporary cultural understanding of religion in
10
America. It is reflected in what my colleague, Mark Movsesian, has de11
scribed as the “rise of the Nones” and what Ross Douthat has character12
ized more polemically as “Bad Religion.” It is a view whose promotion in
law has profoundly entangled the state with religion inasmuch as it has
contributed to one prominent and currently fashionable understanding
of religion’s nature or essence. The refusal of courts to make any serious
inquiry into the nature of the asserted religious burden has encouraged
increasingly bizarre, aggressive, self-indulgent, ephemeral, and scattershot assertions of religious freedom. It will—and, indeed, it already has—
promoted unserious religion. Small wonder that religion as a legal cate13
gory is in such disreputable odor. Small wonder that religious accommodation is increasingly perceived in politically partisan terms.
This Essay argues that the two most common justifications for deference—institutional incompetence and excessive religious entanglement—are subverted when a court categorically refuses to inquire about
the nature of the burden on religious exercise. Much of the recent academic skepticism concerning religious accommodation has come from
those who are either indifferent or hostile to religion as a category meriting special legal protection. Yet, increasingly, criticism of religious accommodation—and, indeed, of an overreliance by religious people on
arguments for religious accommodation—has come from those who are
sympathetic to religion or are perhaps even religious believers themselves. The Essay concludes by exploring some of those arguments, in
which skepticism about religious accommodation—and in particular the
increasing sense that accommodation is reserved for individualistic, balkanized, politically and culturally unthreatening religion that is dissociated from any enduring tradition or community—has been aggravated by

8

William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human
Nature 166 (University Books, Inc. 1963) (1902) (discussion of the “twice-born”).
9
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718–19 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
10
See infra Part III.
11
Mark L. Movsesian, Defining Religion in American Law: Psychic Sophie and the Rise
of the Nones 1 (Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Stud., EUI Working Paper No.
RSCAS 2014/19, 2014).
12
Ross Douthat, Bad Religion: How We Became a Nation of Heretics 3
(2012).
13
There are multiple causes for religion’s increasingly problematic status as a
special legally protected category, of course. This Essay focuses only on a small group
of those causes, without in any way denying that others exist.
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courts’ total evaluative detachment on the question of the religious burden.
I. DEFERENCE ON THE BURDEN QUESTION
If a legal regime provides no accommodations for religion, it need
not be overly concerned with whether its laws have the incidental effect
of burdening religion. But regimes that are open to accommodating religion invariably need to know something about the burden imposed by
their laws. Legislators, administrators, and judges must then inquire
about the quality of the burden and evaluate the justification for accommodation against other social interests. At the very least, as Kent
14
Greenawalt has argued, the alleged burden must be “nontrivial.” But
several contemporary formulations appear to require a good deal more
15
in providing that the burden must be “substantial.” The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is fairly representative: “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability,” with exceptions for laws that serve
compelling government interests that are achieved by the “least restric16
tive means.” The term “substantial” is rarely defined with any precision
17
statutorily or in case law, and yet a rapid glance at any dictionary plainly
suggests that the burden on religion must somehow be important, essen18
tial, or considerable.

14

1 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and
Fairness 202 (2006).
15
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b) (2012);
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc(a)(1) (2012). As Angela Carmella has noted, several state constitutions have
been interpreted to require claimants to show a “substantial burden” on their
religious beliefs or practices. Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protections of
Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 275, 275–76
(1993). Not all states that protect religious freedom through religious
accommodation require a “substantial” burden. See, for example, Missouri and
Rhode Island’s RFRAs, which provide that a law may not “restrict” religious exercise.
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 1.302 (West 2013); R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80.1 (2006). New Mexico
and Texas statutes speak of an “act or refusal to act” that is “motivated” by a “sincere
religious belief . . . .” New Mexico adds the requirement that the motivation be
“substantia[l].” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-22-2 (2013); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 110.001 (West 2011). Connecticut uses the language of “burden” in its state RFRA
without “substantial.” Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571b (West 2013).
16
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b).
17
Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L. Rev.
1175, 1213 (1996) (“Neither the text nor the legislative history of RFRA provides any
clear indication of how courts ought to determine whether an incidental burden on
religion is in fact substantial.”). A few lower court formulations are considered infra.
18
See, e.g., 17 The Oxford English Dictionary 66–67 (2d ed. 1989)
(substantial is synonymous with “ample” or “considerable”). There are other ways to
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Notwithstanding this seemingly high threshold, however, judicial inquiries into the importance or status of the religious exercise being bur19
dened are absolutely forbidden. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act follows the spirit of the Smith decision in stating
that “religious exercise” includes “any exercise of religion, whether or
20
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” It is an
oddity of the statutory language (and perhaps even a suggestion of internal incoherence), however, that the assumption even in this statute,
which purports to disavow inquiries about centrality, seems to be that the
claimant should not come to court at all without a “system of religious be21
lief,” a component of which has been burdened.
Likewise, after the Supreme Court fundamentally altered the framework for accommodation claims in 1963 to require an assessment of a
law’s “substantial burden” on religious exercise, questions quickly arose
22
about exactly what a court should consider. Almost no criterion has
23
been thought sufficiently hands-off or deferential. Requirements of a
religious system of beliefs, internal consistency, and even rough alignment of beliefs with others within the religious community or group of
24
which the claimant says he is a member all have been held out of order.
Courts have repeatedly held that an individual’s beliefs need not correspond at all with—indeed, may run directly contrary to—the beliefs of
the religious group, community, or tradition with which the individual
25
claims to be associated. True, the Court has also suggested in dicta
(usually buried deep in footnotes) that extreme or “bizarre” deviations
from the beliefs and practices of the claimant’s alleged religious commu26
nity might be problematic. But these little asides have never posed any
real obstacle. The standard by which religiousness is measured is the in27
dividual believer alone.

interpret “substantial”—as relating to substance, for example, or as being real or true
rather than illusory—but these interpretations seem rather peculiar in this context.
19
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990).
20
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A).
21
For further discussion, see infra Part II.
22
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–06 (1963).
23
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
24
E.g., id. at 716.
25
See, e.g., id. (“[I]t is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to
inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the
commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation.”); Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 320–21 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasizing
autonomy interests in religious self-identification notwithstanding a religious
community’s judgment to the contrary).
26
Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 n.2 (1989); Thomas, 450
U.S. at 715.
27
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715–16; Jackson, 196 F.3d at 320–21.
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One comparatively uncontroversial premise has been that the claimant should at least be “sincere.” Whether the issue is drug use, withdrawal
of children from school, conscientious objection to military service (on
religious grounds or otherwise) or to other government-imposed mandates, or others, in order to satisfy the requirement of substantial burden,
the claimant must, at a minimum, be telling the truth about his beliefs.
28
Excepting cases of incontestable and practically self-confessed fraud,
however, courts and administrators have shown great reluctance to in29
quire into the authenticity of a claimant’s sincerity. The claimant’s sayso both about what he believes and how important his beliefs may be are
generally sufficient, for the state is not in any position to question the authenticity of what he says he believes. If sincerity is all that is left of the
substantial burden inquiry, not much actually remains.
Even that may be disappearing. Some scholars have criticized inquir30
ies into sincerity as altogether misguided. It is said that evaluations of
sincerity interfere with highly personal and perpetually shifting interests
31
in self-definition. Professor Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, for example, tells
the story of a prison administrator charged with determining whether a
32
prisoner who desired a Seder dinner was authentically Jewish. Though
the administrator believed the prisoner was lying about his religious
commitments, he allowed the dinner because religiosity implicates mat33
ters of murky or evanescent personal identity. Professor Mark Tushnet
likewise is skeptical about “the capacity of institutional decision makers,
such as arbitrators or administrators of public benefits programs, to de34
termine sincerity.” “[T]he government rarely contests sincerity[,]”
35
writes Professor Fred Gedicks, “and courts rarely adjudicate it.” For
these scholars, even sincerity about religion either eludes judicial evaluation or is essentially meaningless.
28

Parodies meant to mock existing legal or political arrangements also seem not
to qualify as sincere, as Nathan Chapman argues in a fine draft article, Adjudicating
Religious Sincerity (on file with author).
29
See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1508–09 (D. Wyo. 1995)
(holding that the “Church of Marijuana” was not a bona fide religion, but refraining
from stating that the individual claimant was lying). This pattern of reticence can be
traced to United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87–88 (1944), in which the Court held
that juries ought neither to determine questions of falsity nor sincerity as to religious
beliefs because those two are bound up together.
30
Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May (and Why They
Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming Jan.
2017) (manuscript at 7), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657733.
31
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 441, 453 (1998).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Mark Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion Thirty Years On, 38 Harv. J. L. &
Gender 1, 10 (2015).
35
Gedicks, supra note 30 (manuscript at 7).
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Notwithstanding what appears a generous test, religious claimants often have lost under it in court, but the reasons far more frequently involve solicitude for government interests that clash with a substantial
burden than with skepticism about the claimant’s assertion of a substan36
tial burden. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that an asserted burden on religion did not rise to the requisite level of substantiality in only
two cases about religious accommodation—Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v.
37
38
California Board of Equalization and Bowen v. Roy. In Swaggart, the Court
ruled unanimously that a generally applicable sales and use tax did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause when it was applied to the sale of religious literature because “[t]here is no evidence in this case that collection and payment of the tax violates appellant’s sincere religious be39
liefs.” Having less money to spend on religious activities than would
have been the case without the sales tax was not a “constitutionally signif40
icant” burden.
In Bowen, a majority of the Court concluded that the government
could use internally and for its own purposes the Social Security number
assigned to the daughter of Native American parents, notwithstanding
the parents’ claim that use of the number would “rob the spirit” of their
41
daughter. But a majority also believed that the parents should not have
42
to supply the number. The Court’s assumption seems to have been that
the objection to the number was sufficiently religiously powerful or important to exempt the claimants from this sort of compliance.
In another case not involving religious accommodation, Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the Court found that the
federal government’s plan to build a road straight through a Native
American burial ground did not impose a substantial burden on Native
American religious exercise because the law had “no tendency to coerce
43
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs . . . .” Even
though the Court admitted that the road might “virtually destroy the . . .
44
Indians’ ability to practice their religion,” this was of no moment be-

36

See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982); see also
Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 214 (“[T]he compelling interest test in [religious]
exemption cases has never been quite what it seems.”).
37
493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990).
38
476 U.S. 693, 712 (1986).
39
Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 391.
40
Id.
41
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 696, 701.
42
Id. at 714–15 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part); id. at 728 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part).
43
485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988).
44
Id. at 451–52 (quoting Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 795
F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 1986)) (alteration in original).
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cause the road did not compel the Native Americans to do anything, or
45
not to do anything, in violation of their religious commitments.
The Court’s substantial burden jurisprudence has, in sum, been extremely meager. It has found the standard satisfied in virtually every oth46
er religious accommodation case. Indeed, its standard practice is essentially to assume that a belief about the nature of the burden is sincere
47
and “move on to the next steps of the analysis.” Likewise, though federal appellate courts are slightly more likely than the Supreme Court to
find the substantial burden requirement unsatisfied, they too, generally
defer. Setting aside the colossal and complicated ACA contraception
mandate litigation (of which more below), over the past five years these
courts have found the substantial burden inquiry satisfied at a rate of
48
more than two to one. Yet in the ongoing nonprofit contraception
45

For criticism, see Marc O. DeGirolami, The Tragedy of Religious Freedom
168–71 (2013).
46
In United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982), the Court held against an
Amish farm and carpentry shop’s religious objection to paying Social Security taxes,
but the Court actually found that the requirement imposed a substantial burden on
religion.
47
Tushnet, supra note 34, at 10 n.59 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014)) (“Arrogating the authority to provide a binding
national answer to this religious and philosophical question, HHS . . . in effect tell[s]
the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed. For good reason, we have repeatedly
refused to take such a step.”).
48
From 2011 to 2015, the federal appellate courts found the substantial burden
requirement satisfied in reported cases including: Knight v. Thompson, 797 F.3d 934,
944 (11th Cir. 2015) (substantial burden was stipulated); Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d
169, 180 (4th Cir. 2015); Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2015);
Schlemm, 784 F.3d at 365 (finding genuine issue of material fact as to burden); Davila
v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015); Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554,
566–67 (6th Cir. 2014); Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 2014); Native
American Council of Tribes v. Weber, 750 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2014); Wall v.
Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 499 (4th Cir. 2014) (substantial burden was stipulated);
Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 57 (10th Cir. 2014); Chance v. Tex. Dep’t of
Criminal Justice, 730 F.3d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 2013); (substantial burden was
stipulated); Garner v. Kennedy, 713 F.3d 237, 244 (5th Cir. 2013); Bethel World
Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cty. Council, 706 F.3d 548, 559 (4th Cir. 2013)
(finding genuine issue of material fact as to burden); Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of
Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 795 (5th Cir. 2012); Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner,
694 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Ali, 682 F.3d 705, 711 (8th Cir.
2012); Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 200 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lafley, 656
F.3d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 2011) (assuming substantial burden); Maddox v. Love, 655
F.3d 709, 720 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding genuine issue of material fact as to burden);
United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1284 (10th Cir. 2011); Int’l Church of the
Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011)
(finding genuine issue of material fact as to burden). Those that find it unsatisfied
include: Andon, LLC v. City of Newport News, 813 F.3d 510, 512 (4th Cir. 2016);
Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2015); Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d
105, 107 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that “In God We Trust” on the currency did not
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mandate litigation, nearly every Court of Appeals to address the issue has
49
held that the claimants were not substantially burdened —a remarkable
volte-face, in light of the purportedly hyper-deferential inquiry, that is difficult to explain without resorting to factors quite extraneous to legal
doctrine and yet eminently germane to the political polarization of reli50
gious accommodation.
There are two principal arguments for deference as to the nature of
the burden, both of which are meant to address, at least in part, the
problem of religious accommodation’s association with political polarization. First, courts simply are not competent institutions to evaluate religious beliefs and practices. As the Supreme Court put it in United States v.
Lee and Thomas v. Review Board: “It is not within ‘the judicial function and
judicial competence,’ however, to determine whether appellee or the
Government has the proper interpretation of the Amish faith; ‘[c]ourts
51
are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.’” The argument from incompetence suggests precisely that courts are poor judges of what religion may require. The focus is on the proper function or role of courts:
religion is the sort of thing that the judiciary, as an institution, is not well
suited to understand. Courts are not skilled in such matters: they “lack
the tools to engage in line drawing when it comes to determining and
calibrating the degree of theological impact a particular law imposes on
52
religion.” Removing courts from the sphere of competence as to religion is thought to have the effect of shielding them from making judgments about religious affairs and, in this sense, preserving their neutrality
as to religion.
substantially burden atheists’ beliefs); Mutawakkil v. Huibregtse, 735 F.3d 524, 528
(7th Cir. 2013); Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d
78, 100 (1st Cir. 2013); Hartmann v. Ca. Dep’t of Corr., 707 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir.
2013); Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, 703 F.3d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 2012); McFaul v.
Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 577 (5th Cir. 2012); Mahoney v Doe, 642 F.3d 1112, 1121–
22 (D.C. Cir. 2011); DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 153 (5th Cir. 2011).
49
See, e.g., Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1129 (11th Cir. 2016); Grace Sch. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d
788, 791 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2011 (2016); Little Sisters of the Poor
Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1160 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S.
Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016); Mich. Catholic Conference v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738, 746 (6th
Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2450 (2016); Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796
F.3d 207, 210 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2450 (2016); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v.
Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Univ. of
Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 618 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007
(2016); Geneva Coll. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 427 (3d
Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Priests for Life v. U.S. Dept. of Health &
Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 F.3d 1557 (2016).
50
For further discussion, see Part IV infra.
51
Lee, 455 U.S. at 257 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)).
52
Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens 18 (Pepperdine Univ. Sch.
Law, Paper No. 2016/3, 2016).
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Second, courts ought to defer to a claimant’s understanding of the
burden’s quality not merely because they are poor judges of religion or
because they are likely to make mistakes, but because even if they were
good judges of religion they would risk excessively entangling church
and state with too searching an inquiry. That is, their inquiries might
trigger anti-establishment concerns. Thus, the Court has said that “the
First Amendment forbids civil courts from” interpreting “particular
church doctrines” or opining on the “importance of those doctrines to
53
the religion.” The Court’s understandable reticence to tell Hobby Lobby that it was wrong about its own beliefs, or that its beliefs were “flawed,”
suggests exactly a reluctance to deal with issues that might entangle it in
54
“religious and philosophical question[s]” or draw it “into impermissible
55
questions of theology.” To like effect is the Establishment-Clause leg of
the ruling in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
EEOC, where the Court held that the clause prohibits “government in56
volvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.” For a court to declare what is
and is not important in the religious life of a claimant risks this type of
inappropriate establishmentarian “involvement.” Once again, the effect is
said to be to separate the civil and religious realms, mitigating the risk of
political polarization if courts were more deeply involved in making
judgments about burdens on religious exercise.
Both arguments at least indirectly address and aim to deflect the objection that religious accommodation is one of the spoils of political influence. The first does so by separating religious and civil concerns as a
matter of expertise and competence. The second does so by preventing
courts from making the sorts of judgments about religion that might be
perceived as non-neutral and a violation of the Establishment Clause. In
the following sections, this Essay explores these two arguments and questions whether they are successful in dissociating religious accommodation and political polarization.
II. THE ARGUMENT FROM INSTITUTIONAL INCOMPETENCE
The argument from institutional incompetence supposes that civil
decision makers are poor arbiters when it comes to religion. Drawing in
part from John Locke’s views, the claim is that the arguments and tools
available to the civil authority (force, in particular) are ineffectual means
57
of evaluation and suasion when it comes to religion. James Madison’s
53

Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969).
54
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014).
55
Helfand, supra note 52, at 22.
56
565 U.S. 171, 188–89 (2012).
57
See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 162 (Wilson, Spence &
Mawman eds., 1788) (1689).
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position was to like effect: civil authorities are incompetent judges when
58
it comes to religious truth. The spheres of religious and civil authority
are distinct. Advocates of this type of institutional separation are skeptical
that religious knowledge is available to the civil authority and vice versa.
Yet when one considers some of Madison’s own reasons for civil incompetence as to religion, the claim of civil incompetence appears in a
more complicated and qualified light. To support his view that the
spheres of religious and civil authority are distinct, Madison relies heavily
on the example of Christianity. To say that an establishment is necessary
to support Christianity:
[I]s a contradiction to the Christian Religion itself, for every page
of it disavows a dependence on the powers of this world: it is a contradiction to fact; for it is known that this Religion both existed and
flourished, not only without the support of human laws, but in spite
of every opposition from them, and not only during the period of
miraculous aid, but long after it had been left to its own evidence
and the ordinary care of Providence. Nay, it is a contradiction in
terms; for a Religion not invented by human policy, must have preexisted and been supported, before it was established by human
policy. It is moreover to weaken in those who profess this Religion a
pious confidence in its innate excellence and the patronage of its
Author; and to foster in those who still reject it, a suspicion that its
59
friends are too conscious of its fallacies to trust it to its own merits.

Underlying Madison’s argument of civil incompetence to evaluate religion are several assumptions about the nature of religion, which Madison
extrapolates from Christianity’s history (or at least the Christian history
he offers). First, the reason for the civil authority’s incompetence as to
religion is that religion is an ancient phenomenon with an extremely
long history—one comprising many “pages” that predates the civil au60
thority and that has survived over time in spite of it. Indeed, one might
say that Christianity has proved itself to be its own establishment, its own
independent institution that has developed over time and under the
tending of generations of practicing Christians, which therefore cannot
be co-opted by the state. Christianity’s doctrines, its tradition “left to its
own evidence,” developed and flourished over many years during which
its durability was perpetually tested by the civil authority. It is for this reason that it would be perverse, “a contradiction in terms[,]” to believe that
civil institutions could have anything decisive to say about the institution
61
of Christianity, and by extension of the institution of religion.
58

James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments (1785), reprinted in James Madison: Writings 29, 32 (Jack N. Rakove
ed., 1999).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
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Second, civil intermeddling with religion might “weaken” the “pious
confidence” of the community or group of people committed to it and
62
strengthen the suspicion of its skeptics. Again, the institutional, communal quality of Madison’s argument is critical: the civil authority’s establishment of religion might threaten or subvert the institutional compe63
tence of the community of the truly devout. The assumption is that there
is such an institutional community—with its own authority, competency,
history, and collection of beliefs and practices—which has sustained
Christianity, which exists alongside but independent from the civil authority, and whose intelligibly distinctive competency could be injured by
the intrusion of the state. To be sure, Madison also refers several times in
the Memorial and Remonstrance to the “conscience of every man” as invio64
lable. But here, when he specifically considers the matter of institutional
competence, Madison’s argument is addressed to the preservation of the
distinct institution and tradition of religious authority.
Madison’s key insight in this portion of the Memorial and Remonstrance is that arguments about the institutional incompetence of the civil
authority and related claims of institutional deference by judges assume
the existence of other institutions in civil society that are competent as to
the matter at issue. In a recent essay, Professor Phillip Muñoz suggests
that what the founding generation meant by “religion” was fairly tightly
restricted to matters of communal “worship,” and he cites to Madison’s
own official presidential proclamation calling for a day of “public humiliation and prayer”:
If the public homage of a people can ever be worthy [of] the favorable regard of the Holy and Omniscient Being to whom it is addressed, it must be that, in which those who join in it are guided only by their free choice, by the impulse of their hearts and the
65
dictates of their consciences . . . .

What is of interest in this passage is not that religious belief must be free
and “uncoerced” (as he later puts it), though that is certainly important.
It is instead the assumption that communal “worship” is a distinctive substantive element of the category “religion” and that “worship” is engaged
in by a group of believers (the “public homage of a people”) affirming
62

Id.
See Kathleen A. Brady, The Distinctiveness of Religion in American Law:
Rethinking Religion Clause Jurisprudence 124 (2015) (“Government involvement
in religious matters also harms the institutions whose role it is to help identify and
teach this truth and to nurture faith.”).
64
Madison, supra note 58, at 30.
65
Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Two Concepts of Religious Liberty: The Natural Rights and
Moral Autonomy Approaches to the Free Exercise of Religion, 110 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 369,
370–71 (2016) (quoting James Madison, Proclamation on Day of Public Humiliation
and Prayer (July 23, 1813), http://millercenter.org/president/madison/speeches/
speech-3622).
63
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the same set of beliefs. It is the group-like, communal, institutional quality of religion assumed by Madison to define religion and to justify the
state’s non-intrusion.
Indeed, judicial deference in other contexts frequently depends upon evaluations of the comparative expertise of other institutions of civil
society. As Professor Paul Horwitz has observed, “courts defer to other institutions when they believe that those institutions know more than the
courts do about some set of issues, such that it makes sense to allow the
views of the knowledgeable authority to substitute for the courts’ own
66
judgment.” As comparative advantages in institutional knowledge or
expertise diminish, so does the justification for epistemic deference by
courts.
While Horwitz lists several public institutions—administrative agen67
cies, the military, prisons, and public universities —to which courts regularly defer, deference to private institutions and associations may be epistemically warranted as well. Consider in this respect an example that may
seem far afield but is in some ways analogous: the business judgment
68
rule. Courts presume that “in making a business decision the directors
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the com69
pany.” As Judge Winter once explained, while:
[A]n automobile driver who makes a mistake in judgment as to
speed or distance injuring a pedestrian will likely be called upon
to respond in damages, a corporate officer who makes a mistake
in judgment as to economic conditions, consumer tastes or production line efficiency will rarely, if ever, be found liable for
70
damages suffered by the corporation.
One crucial reason is that courts and businesses operate in different
domains—different spheres of expertise—so that “after-the-fact litigation
71
is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions.”
The rule prescribes “abstention” on the part of courts because they lack
66

Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1061, 1085 (2008).
Id. at 1087–89.
68
Whether contractual relationships such as businesses are subsets of private
associations or the other way round is debatable. See, e.g., Marc O. DeGirolami,
Classical Liberalism: Teaching Its Own Undoing, Libr. L. & Liberty (Jan. 6, 2016),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/classical-liberalism-teaching-its-ownundoing/; Richard Epstein, Freedom of Association and Antidiscrimination Law: An
Imperfect Reconciliation, Libr. L. & Liberty (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.
libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/freedom-of-association-and-antidiscrimination-lawan-imperfect-reconciliation/.
69
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
70
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982).
71
Id. at 886.
67
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72

the expertise to assess business decisions. Yet this deference has limits:
where the decision lacks a business purpose or where it is not made in
“good faith” and with “honest belief” in its soundness, and certainly when
73
it is fraudulent, the presumption may be overcome.
There are several common assumptions when courts defer to religious claimants who seek accommodations: just as courts acquiesce in
“good faith” decisions by the directors of corporations, so too, do they
defer to “sincere” religious claimants, because in both cases courts are
not in an epistemically advantageous position to evaluate the judgment
of the private institution. They are likely in both cases to lack the requisite competencies. Indeed, one might well rename the parallel set of presumptions pressed by Madison and many others the “religious judgment
rule.”
Yet just as the business judgment rule assumes the existence of established institutions with comparative advantages in expertise when it
comes to making business decisions, the religious judgment rule also depends upon a similar assumption. Epistemic deference, in either context,
would not otherwise be warranted. Without any baseline understanding
of what constitutes “religious judgments” and which institutions are competent to make them, the presumption of deference is greatly destabilized. For courts are just as competent to detect and evaluate fraud, bad
faith, dishonesty, delusion, and frivolousness in the business context as in
the religious context.
True, as to religion, the issue is complicated by larger disagreements
about the primacy of institutional or individual religious freedom in
American law. If the individual, or the individual conscience, is the locus
of religious authority, then he or she (or it) is the “institution” to which
courts must defer. Some recent scholarship contends that group, corporate, or truly institutional religious freedom is the primary right (or at
least a co-equal right with individual religious freedom), while other
74
scholars resist this view. Some argue that individual religious freedom is

72

Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
Vand. L. Rev. 83, 119 (2004).
73
Id. at 100; see also D. Gordon Smith, The Modern Business Judgment Rule (BYU
Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 15-09, 2015).
74
See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, First Amendment Institutions 82 (2013); Steven
D. Smith, The Rise and Decline of American Religious Freedom 37 (2014);
Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) an Exposition, Translation,
and Defense, 21 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 33, 46 (2013); Douglas Laycock, The
Campaign Against Religious Liberty, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty 231,
231 (Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016); Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman,
Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 Va. L. Rev. 917, 919 (2013).
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derivative of or parasitic on institutional religious freedom while others
75
argue for the reverse.
While it is not necessary to resolve this debate conclusively, it is helpful to see the argument from epistemic deference on a continuum. Epistemic deference becomes more and more sensible where courts are confronted by claims of religious burdens that are part of a larger set of
interconnected beliefs and practices. The comparative advantages in institutional knowledge increase for religion, and decrease for courts, as
the religious tradition becomes more complex, intricate, group-like, and
enduring. It stands to reason that, in the main, the more developed and
mature the religious tradition—the more “pages” of history and experience it comprises and the more it has been sustained and cultivated over
76
time by groups of believers —the more compelling the justification for
epistemic deference becomes. Conversely, the institutional competence
of courts increases as the institutional expertise of religion decreases. As
the claim for accommodation becomes disconnected from a religious
tradition—as it becomes deracinated from any larger body of durable beliefs and practices within which it is integrated and handed down intergenerationally—there is less and less specifically religious institutional
knowledge to which courts must defer.
Precisely the contrary assumption underlies the hyper-deference accorded to individual beliefs and practices under the prevailing doctrine.
The individual believer’s sincerity about what he believes is often sufficient to satisfy the standard, even when (perhaps even especially when)
his beliefs and practices run contrary to the institution or religious tradition of which he claims to be a member. Religion thus becomes synonymous with autonomous conviction. Yet that approach has undermined
the very argument for deference that it was meant to justify: that courts
are incompetent institutions to make judgments about religion. And it
has also deprived the legal category of “religion” of everything except the
name—a name that the shrewd claimant is well advised to attach to whatever autonomous conviction he happens to hold.
III. THE ARGUMENT FROM EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT
What of the second justification for rigorous deference on the question of religious burden—the danger of excessive entanglement between
the civil and religious authority? Against my suggestion that religious traditions and groups suffer under the current regime, I can report that
75

Compare Smith, supra note 74, at 37, with Ashutosh Bhagwat, Religious
Associations: Hosanna-Tabor and the Instrumental Value of Religious Groups, 92 Wash. U.
L. Rev. 73, 93–94 (2014), and Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The
Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 Fordham L.
Rev. 1965, 1987 (2007).
76
Madison, supra note 58, at 33.
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most reactions emphasize the individuality of religious belief: what of the
solitary claimant who seeks a draft exemption because he believes that
77
God or moral “goodness” forbids him from killing people? Or the lone
seeker who cannot point to any existing system of religious belief for her
sincere view that abiding by a zoning ordinance disrupts her spiritual
78
“inner flow”? Unlike the argument from institutional incompetence,
concerns about excessive state entanglement in religion are motivated by
the view that it is inappropriate or wrong for the state to control religion
or to steer it in any particular direction. The state must be neutral as to
79
religion, and courts must not improperly favor or promote organized
religious traditions with comparatively stable and long histories while dis80
favoring new or emerging religious phenomena. Psychic Sophie or
81
82
Robert Bellah’s Sheila, who follow their “own little voice[,]” are at least
as much religions as Roman Catholicism or Judaism.
Indeed, perhaps they are even more so. I am skeptical about how
“neutrality” is deployed in this set of reactions. It is telling that in the
minds of many of my interlocutors, religion is immediately associated
with the ineffably subjective, inarticulable experiences, desires, and personal commitments of individual claimants. That perception of religion—as a changeable set of fragmented and idiosyncratic views mirroring the self’s then-existing needs—is also reflected in the single-most
rapidly growing religious constituency in the United States (particularly
83
among millennials), the unaffiliated “Nones.” The Nones hold a broad
range of convictions, but the abiding dislike of institutional religion and
84
the lack of importance they attach to religion are constants. In a fairly
recent survey of the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, a quarter of
the Nones reported they believe in astrology; a quarter of them believe in
reincarnation; 30% of them say they believe in the spiritual energy of
85
crystals, trees, or mountains. But few take any of these views seriously or
77

See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 186 (1965) (noting with
approval that the court of appeals “found little distinction between Jakobson’s
devotion to a mystical force of ‘Godness’ and Seeger’s compulsion to ‘goodness’”).
78
See Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 571 (4th Cir. 2013).
79
See generally Andrew Koppelman, Defending American Religious
Neutrality (2013).
80
Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 564. The Fourth Circuit held that Psychic Sophie’s
beliefs did not constitute a religion, though there are reasons to wonder why. Id. at
571. For discussion, see Movsesian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 3–5).
81
Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and
Commitment in American Life 221 (1985).
82
Id.
83
See Movsesian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 1); see also Pew Research Ctr.,
“Nones” on the Rise: One-in-Five Adults Have No Religious Affiliation (2012),
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/10/NonesOnTheRise-full.pdf.
84
Pew Research Ctr., supra note 83, at 24–25.
85
Id. at 24.
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attach much importance to them; in fact, this is one of the few attributes
86
that binds them together as a group. To be religious in this conception
is to invent and reinvent one’s own spirituality at need, often in ways that
87
88
celebrate and reaffirm the ego. It is to be “spiritual, but not religious”
because of discomfort with any God other than the God within, “the di89
vinity that resides inside your very self and soul.” It is to satisfy the
90
changeable yearnings and longings of the individual spirit.
This type of individualistic and subjective understanding of religion
is not new in America; nineteenth century Transcendentalism is one
forebear, and there are probably several others. But, as my colleague,
Mark Movsesian, writes:
Unlike earlier idiosyncratic believers, today’s Nones cannot be dismissed as “a small group of ‘kooks’ who just don’t fit into respectable American society.” Nones comprise perhaps one-fifth of the
adult population and are perhaps the third largest religious group
in the country. To quote Charles Taylor, the “ethic of authenticity”
and “expressive individualism” that fascinated Romantic elites like
91
the Transcendentalists has gone mainstream.

The growing solipsism, “do-it-yourself”-ism, and consumer-oriented spir92
ituality of American religion is transforming the American religious
landscape profoundly as traditional religious orthodoxies of various kinds
that do not conform to the Nones’ model are increasingly rejected as ab93
errant and extreme.

86

See Religious Landscape Study: Importance of Religion in One’s Life, Pew Research
Ctr., http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/importance-of-religion-inones-life/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (reporting that 66% of Nones say that religion is
“not at all important” or “not too important” in their lives, while only 13% say that it
is “very important”).
87
See Robert C. Fuller, Spiritual, but Not Religious: Understanding
Unchurched America 5 (2001).
88
Id.
89
Douthat, supra note 12, at 216.
90
See, e.g., Kathryn Lofton, Oprah: The Gospel of an Icon 209 (2011);
Corinna Nicolaou, A None’s Story: Searching for Meaning Inside
Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, & Islam at XII–XIII (2016) (describing the
author’s exploration of these religions as “a personal quest to acquaint [herself] with
religion”).
91
Movsesian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 8) (footnotes and citations omitted)
(quoting Fuller, supra note 87, at 154).
92
Douthat, supra note 12, at 62.
93
A fairly recent study by the Barna Research Group finds that 50–79% of
respondents believe that the following are examples of “very” or “somewhat”
“extreme” religion: “[d]emonstrat[ing] outside an organization they consider
immoral”; “[p]reach[ing] a religious message in a public place”; “[a]ttempt[ing] to
convert others to their faith”; and “[p]ray[ing] out loud in public for a stranger,”
among others. See Five Ways Christianity Is Increasingly Viewed as Extremist, Barna Grp.
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Law has played its part as well, modest though it may be. It has both
reflected and reaffirmed these larger cultural trends. The predominant
conception of religion in American law bears a close resemblance to the
consumerist model of religion described by sociologist Grace Davie as the
94
“marketplace” approach. Religious groups splinter and diversify—the
better to suit the felt desires of existing and prospective adherents. They
compete with one another as service providers or private firms would,
with the consumer selecting the religion that best corresponds to his present circumstances. The consumer changes his associational affiliations
95
accordingly. What is “true” in this model is, as William James once had
it, what most closely accords with “genuine happiness”: “If a creed makes
a man feel happy, he almost inevitably adopts it. Such a belief ought to
96
be true; therefore it is true . . . .” The Jamesian view of religion and its
relationship to truth has had a powerful influence on the Supreme
Court; indeed, it has been explicitly cited by at least one Supreme Court
justice for the proposition that a jury cannot distinguish sincerity of reli97
gious belief from religious truth. Religious freedom thus assumes a
98
highly voluntarist character. The untrammeled freedom of individual
choice-making and choice-changing is the primary object of legal protection because what is “true” depends not on the achievement and retention of a superior religious insight (an insight that the government
would, in any case, be prevented from embracing by the Establishment
Clause) but on the process of choice-making and changing in response
to ever-altering circumstances and desires.
The law of religious accommodation incorporates many of these assumptions. Concerns that the free-exercise balancing test authorized a
kind of over-pluralized, autonomized anarchy motivated the Court to
change course in Employment Division v. Smith, where it returned to the
99
pre-Sherbert exemption regime. But the passage of RFRA (unanimous in
the House—a more lopsided vote than the Declaration of War following
(Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.barna.com/research/five-ways-christianity-is-increasinglyviewed-as-extremist/.
94
Grace Davie, The Sociology of Religion 73 (2007).
95
Id. at 12.
96
James, supra note 8, at 78–79.
97
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92–93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“I
do not see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations as
to what is believable. The most convincing proof that one believes his statements is to
show that they have been true in his experience.”).
98
Some of the most eloquent defenses of religious freedom in the United States
begin from explicitly voluntarist premises. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religious Displays
and the Voluntary Approach to Church and State, 63 Okla. L. Rev. 47, 48 (2010); Douglas
Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 51, 65 (2007); Christopher
C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAS, S.D. L. Rev. 466, 467
(2010).
99
494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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Pearl Harbor received) and RLUIPA, together with sundry state versions
of RFRA, restored the autonomized approach as the primary test against
which religious exemption claims are evaluated. As already noted, these
laws generally instruct courts to avoid inquiries into the centrality of a be100
lief; indeed, Smith itself said so. Subjective perceptions of burdens may
not be questioned because religious exercise is primarily understood as a
matter of autonomous, individual choice—a choice that must be hon101
ored because it is personally “fulfilling” and that marks off one’s dis102
tinctive human “identity.”
This is hardly a neutral approach to religion. It is one that fosters a
very particular conception of religion, one that a critic might perceive as
debased, ephemeral, shallow, and unserious. Yet however perceived, if
the objection to judicial evaluations of religious burden in accommodation cases is that courts would thereby be excessively entangling the state
and religion, it seems to neglect that courts and the state are already entangled neck-deep in religion. The tests for religious accommodation—
including the conventional gloss on the substantial burden inquiry—
champion and systematically promote a specific and highly contestable
understanding of religion, one that happens, perhaps not coincidentally,
to align neatly with the premises of some of the most culturally powerful
religious trends in America.
For years, prominent scholars have made arguments trading on the
Madisonian idea that establishment corrupts religion and that longstanding civic traditions such as legislative prayer render religion an un103
serious affair. But these are not the only possible state-promoted corrupting and unserious influences on religion. Professor Mark Tushnet
has recently argued that accommodationist decisions like Hobby Lobby
104
“lower the cost of faith.” They weaken religion because they cheapen
105
belief. It is rather late in the day, however, for such complaints. If the
American law of religious accommodation has promoted unserious religion, the root of the problem runs deeper than a decision issued three

100

Id. at 886–87; Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012).
101
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
102
See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1853 (2014) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“A person’s response to the doctrine, language, and imagery contained
in those invocations reveals a core aspect of identity—who that person is and how she
faces the world.”).
103
See, e.g., Perry Dane, Prayer Is Serious Business: Reflections on Town of Greece, 15
Rutgers J.L. & Religion 611, 616–17, 616 n.2 (2014); Andrew Koppelman,
Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1831, 1873–
74 (2009).
104
See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 34, at 26; see also Mark Tushnet, In Praise of
Martyrdom, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 1117, 1119 (1999).
105
Tushnet, supra note 34, at 26.
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years ago. It is implicated in the very conception of religion that American law has steadfastly championed over decades.
IV. ACCOMMODATION SKEPTICISM AND
POLITICAL POLARIZATION
In recent years, skepticism about religious accommodation from
those who are either indifferent or hostile to religion has become an al106
together banal staple of the academic literature. That skepticism has
been spurred on by the sense that religious accommodation challenges
107
what Tushnet has described as the “equality agenda.” It is manifest in
the effluvium of accommodation-critical commentary motivated by perceived threats to sundry interests in sexual liberty and equality of increas108
ingly recondite varieties. And it is closely connected to another growing
cache of scholarship that questions whether religion as a category merits
109
any special legal treatment at all.
Yet skepticism about religious accommodation is also coming from
less expected quarters—from those who are sympathetic to religion or
110
perhaps even religious believers themselves. This literature has attracted almost no notice. The standard view continues to be that those who
are sympathetic to religion are always disposed favorably toward accom111
112
modation. While that has largely been true over the last few decades,
it may be changing. And the changes are in part attributable to the political polarization resulting from the accommodation strategy.
In a recent essay, for example, Professor Maimon Schwarzschild
plausibly suggests that one of the principal effects of the accommodation
strategy over the last century has been to balkanize religion—to fragment
113
it into ever-smaller constituencies. When religious accommodations
were first constitutionalized, their effect was to incentivize the creation of
sects, since it was such sects, and not more established religious institutions and traditions, that would be in a political position to need court106

Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise by Moonlight, 53 San Diego L. Rev. 105, 108

(2016).
107

Tushnet, supra note 34, at 19.
For citation to and discussion of this literature, see DeGirolami, supra note
106, at 108, and Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 154, 159–
60 (2014).
109
See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 74, at 232; Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25
Const. Comment. 1, 25 (2008).
110
Maimon Schwarzschild, Do Religious Exemptions Save?, 53 San Diego L. Rev.
185, 187 (2016).
111
Id. at 185.
112
For some of the early standard bearers, see, for example, Douglas Laycock,
The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 4; Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 3 (1985).
113
Schwarzschild, supra note 110, at 194.
108
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114

sanctioned accommodation. Constitutionalized religious accommodation was, moreover, a kind of ersatz legal compensation for the expungement of traditional institutional religion from civic life advocated
by legal scholars with secular commitments and steadily mandated by the
115
Supreme Court in the twentieth century. Just at the moment when the
Court was disallowing religious symbols and exercises in the public
square (in public schools and on civil property, for example), it also began to offer religious accommodations as a matter of constitutional right
116
and subsequently legislative grace.
“Yet the tradeoff[,]” writes Schwarzschild, “of religious interests lost
117
and gained is not really symmetrical or balanced.” Its effect was to punish established religious traditions such as Mainline Protestantism and to
promote, at first, religions including Seventh-Day Adventism and the
Amish, which, though far from the Mainline, had distinctive histories of
118
their own. Yet with time, and particularly after the fall of the federal
RFRA and the rise of RLUIPA, which specifically protects religion in
prison, the promotion of religious balkanization and sectification
119
through the accommodation strategy increased dramatically.
Of
course, the prison population is not a representative cross-section of
American society. And, naturally, there are many other causes for the decline of Mainline Protestantism and other established religious traditions
120
in America.
Nevertheless, law has contributed to these developments. The fact
that federal law categorically elevates prisoners as special subjects of religious accommodation is suggestive of larger trends and makes a powerful
121
symbolic statement. When the law:
[S]eems to offer exemptions and accommodation to any sect or
cult that seeks it and that claims to be a religion[,] [it] must tend at
least to some degree to legitimate such sectarianism in the public

114

Id.
Id. at 194–95.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 195.
118
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 399, 399 n.1 (1963).
119
US Comm’n on Civil Rights, Enforcing Religious Freedom in Prison 87
(2008) (indicating that of the 250 RLUIPA claims filed in federal courts from 2001
through 2006, more than half were brought by claimants designated as “Pagans,”
“Unknown/Unspecified,” “Native Americans,” and “Muslims”).
120
On some of these causes, see Joseph Bottum, An Anxious Age: The PostProtestant Ethic and the Spirit of America 104–05 (2013).
121
Already the Supreme Court’s favorable decision for the prisoner in Holt v.
Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015), has induced lower court judges to apply more
rigorous standards to prisoner RLUIPA claims. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Wheeler, No.
5:15-CV-130, 2016 WL 1117448, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 22, 2016).
115
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eye and to erode the distinction between faiths with substantial history—and with the intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic resources
that grow with historic development—and sects and cults without
122
such resources.

The hyper-deferential approach to the question of substantial burden on
religious exercise is part of the self-same legacy. It, too, has contributed
to the weakening of organized, traditional religion and to its reduced
and increasingly supplicant position toward the state. These effects are
exacerbated when set alongside an aggressive interpretation of the Establishment Clause that increasingly forbids the civil authority from any
symbolic contact or connection with those religious institutions that have
been historically and culturally central in the American political experience, Christianity most prominent among them. All of this is not neutral
in the least as to religion, unless “neutrality” is understood as the promotion of certain conceptions of religion and the demotion of others.
Another new line of accommodation skepticism cautions that too
single-minded a focus on religious accommodation can divert a religious
community’s attention away from the difficult work of internal fortification and external social and political transformation, and toward the
more defensive work of carving out space for individual belief and prac123
tice sheltered from the reach of the civil authority. There are both potential inward and outward dangers here.
The inward danger is that in the process of seeking accommodations, religious communities may adopt the locutions and distinctive argot of the law in thinking about the nature of their own religious traditions and commitments. And they may be corrupted by it. Yuval Levin,
for example, argues that:
As a practical matter these days, religious liberty is essential not so
much because it protects people’s ability to believe and say certain
things but because it protects people’s ability to live in a certain
way. That way of living—shaped by memory, bounded by tradition,
directed to the future, formed to meet obligations both sacred and
profane, and ultimately answerable to permanent truths—cannot
be embodied in the practice of lone individuals, because at its essence it is about relational commitments . . . . This understanding of
the practical meaning of our first freedom makes it easier to see
why the practice it protects so easily outgrows the narrow bounds of
124
the exercise of religion as envisioned by our legal system.

The primary risk of religious accommodation, Levin argues, is that the
struggle for exemptions from civil authority for the freedom to espouse
religious commitments might be so intense, hard-fought, and all122
123
124

Schwarzschild, supra note 110, at 198.
Yuval Levin, The Perils of Religious Liberty, First Things, Feb. 2016, at 29, 35.
Id. at 34.
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consuming as eventually to be mistaken by those inside the religious
125
community for the religious commitments themselves. The damage will
be especially severe for exactly those religious groups whose commitments are informed and “bounded by tradition.”
The corresponding outward danger of pursuing the accommodation
strategy is that it will deflect energy and resources from the vital enter126
prise of resisting the growth and expanding power of government. Indeed, an exclusive focus on seeking and obtaining accommodations may
ultimately obscure the reason for the increasing need for those very accommodations: the progressive intrusion of the government into areas of
127
civil life that it had never before touched. As the government assumes
an increasingly large role in the life of the citizenry, the territory over
which religion and the state conflict can only increase. The pursuit of religious accommodation concedes that territory. It gives it up for lost. And
the religious communities likely to suffer most through the accommodation strategy are those that have stood longest and hardiest as institutional competitors to the state’s own authority—and, indeed, that historically
have posed the most substantial challenges to the growth of state pow128
er. Religion that is unserious, fragmented, feckless, self-absorbed, and
ephemeral is more likely to be accommodated, precisely because it does
not threaten prevailing political and cultural orthodoxies. Religion that is
serious, integrated, historically stable, enduring, and that presents a system of moral commitments in direct competition with those espoused by
the state is more likely not to be accommodated, precisely because it does
threaten prevailing political and cultural orthodoxies.
Religious accommodation may be, moreover, an unsustainable strategy in the long run: “In an ever-more-minutely regulated polity, you cannot
keep demanding exemptions; and they will not be granted . . . . Religious

125

Id. at 35.
For discussion, see DeGirolami, supra note 106, at 118.
127
See Laycock, supra note 74, at 232 (“Never before in our history had we
attempted to require people to violate a core religious teaching of our largest
religions.”).
128
The locus classicus for the importance of religious institutions and the
associations of civil society more broadly as vital competitors to the state and as a
safeguard against tyranny is 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 310–
11 (Henry Reeve trans., The Colonial Press rev. ed. 1900) (1835) (“Religion in
America takes no direct part in the government of society, but it must nevertheless be
regarded as the foremost of the political institutions of that country; for if it does not
impart a taste for freedom, it facilitates the use of free institutions . . . . I do not know
whether all the Americans have a sincere faith in their religion, for who can search
the human heart? But I am certain that they hold it to be indispensable to the
maintenance of republican institutions . . . . The Americans combine the notions of
Christianity and of liberty so intimately in their minds, that it is impossible to make
them conceive the one without the other . . . .”).
126
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Americans need not retreat from robust political action, merely to plead for
129
special indulgence. It will not avail them, or not for long, if they do.”

Admittedly, the prospects of reducing the size of government do not
seem particularly favorable. Perhaps the exemption strategy is all that
remains to religious communities as the ambit of state authority expands,
and the ways in which people may be negatively affected, or “harmed,” by
a state-sanctioned religious accommodation likewise expand. Religious
accommodations are now said, for example, to implicate injuries to the
“dignity” of those who oppose them, the implication of which is that the
state’s authority includes the power to confer human dignity as a self130
standing civic good. People want to be dignified by the state, their selfworth to be accorded official validation, and they perceive accommodation meant for the protection of religious freedom as a state-sanctioned
indignity demanding state remediation. Yet offenses to dignity are only
the most extreme example of the overall expansion of government inter131
ests. These are not hopeful developments for the future of religious accommodation.
This may be an opportune moment to note that, in past work, I have
132
supported religious accommodations. I continue to admire and respect
the work of scholars and policy makers who pursue modus vivendi arrangements that will foster the free exercise of religious communities
and traditions within a larger secular polity that is increasingly dubious
about established, institutional religion. But the claims of the new accommodation skeptics are powerful, and I have begun to doubt that ac129

Schwartzchild, supra note 110, at 199–200; see also Steven D. Smith, The
Tortuous Course of Religious Freedom, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1553, 1557 (2016)(“As
government has expanded the scope of its ambitions and activities, and as legal
requirements and regulations accordingly proliferate, the occasions of conflict
between law and religion multiply.”).
130
For acute analysis of the dignitarian turn in the gay rights context, see Noa
Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37 Harv. J.L.
& Gender 243, 263 (2014) (“Windsor is a pivotal moment in the metamorphosis of
the legal homosexual. The legal homosexual, at least in states where same-sex
marriage is legally recognized, is portrayed as a morally dignified person.”).
131
A well-argued, but similarly sweeping, expansion of the ambit of the state’s
interests holds that the government can regulate expression that violates norms of
“full and equal citizenship” and results in associated harm. See Nelson Tebbe,
Government Nonendorsement, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 648, 650 (2013). As a corollary to his
argument that the government is prohibited from endorsing any view that “abridges
full and equal citizenship in a free society,” Professor Tebbe writes: “Translated into
political morality, government nonendorsement would mean that the limits
identified in this Article should function as the only restrictions on government’s
power to endorse ideas. Within those limits, government should be free to favor or
disfavor a wide range of views, even if they are comprehensive.” Id. at 650, 699–700.
Needless to say, there are numerous religious doctrines and beliefs that are likely to
violate a categorical norm of political liberalism of this type.
132
See DeGirolami, supra note 45, at 147–88.
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commodation is a viable long-term approach. The new skeptics are persuasive that the seeking of religious accommodation has damaged, and
may further damage, those religious traditions that have stood longest
and hardiest, steadily depriving them of vital sources of strength, and
rendering them fragmented, ephemeral, and perhaps even ultimately
unserious affairs.
Might the answer then be to encourage courts to inquire more deeply into the nature of the burden on religion when adjudicating accommodation cases? Unfortunately, that is extremely unlikely to cure what
now ails religious accommodation. Indeed, it is a sign of just how polarized the religious accommodation question has become that no tinkering
with the applicable test is likely to help.
Consider, for example, the recent and ongoing nonprofit litigation
against the federal government’s contraception mandate. Under the existing, abjectly deferential standard for assessing the quality of the burden, the vast majority of courts to address the issue found that the contraception mandate did not impose a substantial burden on the several
133
nonprofits’ religious exercise. The question of the burden on the nonprofits, however, is not difficult when evaluated under a standard that
would require the claimants to explain how their religious objection fits
within an established religious tradition and system of belief and practice.
They have explained, over and again, their view that a legally binding
designation to provide contraceptive products and services implicates
them in sinful behavior, the theological sources of their beliefs, and the
importance of those beliefs within their own religious system and tradi134
tion of belief. The claimants may yet lose, but if they do it should not
be because courts reject or refuse to defer to their explanation of the
government’s interference with their religious exercise.
Yet they did lose on that very issue, before nearly every court of appeals to consider it and according to a standard that is said to be ex135
tremely deferential to their beliefs. That remarkable losing streak,
when compared against the ostensible deference that courts purport to
apply and generally have applied in most other contexts, strongly suggests that the standard may be a secondary consideration altogether.
Courts defer when the nature of the political and cultural challenge represented by the religious exemption is unthreatening—when they don’t
take the religion seriously anyway. Accommodation, as I have said, is for
unserious religion. When it is threatening, and the challenge is substan133

See HHS Information Central, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, http://
www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral#tab2 (last updated June 15, 2016)
(collecting cases). The Supreme Court’s non-resolution of the burden issue is likely
to result in future decisions by the lower courts against the claimants.
134
See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 48, E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct.
1557 (2016) (Nos. 14–1418, 14–1453, 14–1505, 15–35, 15–105, 15–119, 15–191), at *48.
135

Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 133.
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tial, they do not defer. We accommodate when we don’t really care as a
political or cultural matter, and we find reasons not to accommodate
when we do. Perhaps this also suggests that political polarization is to
some extent inevitable when some religious beliefs and exercises are accommodated and some are not, and that, as in so many other contexts
implicating the religion clauses, the aspiration to neutrality is a fantasy.
An alternative possibility is that adopting a more stringent inquiry may be
unwise and possibly counterproductive, since religious accommodation
and religious liberty more broadly, particularly when it is felt to threaten
or even to stand athwart vital gains in sexual liberty and equality, is at
136
present so controversial. A tighter standard will not restore religion as a
coherent legal category. It will more plausibly be used to defeat coherent
religious claims of substantial burden.
CONCLUSION
The relationship of religious accommodation and political polarization is a perennial problem for any society that strives to balance interests
in the rule of law and the toleration of religious groups. The prevailing
strategy to balance those interests in twentieth century American law—
represented by the compelling interest test and its substantial burden requirement, created in the 1960s as constitutional doctrine and reintroduced by statute in the 1990s—has been thought successful because of
two principal features: (1) its solicitude for a conception of religion that
is highly individualistic, claimant-centric, and anti-institutional; and (2)
its simultaneous pretensions to neutrality as to religious questions.
Yet there has always been, to put it mildly, a tension between these
components of the religious accommodation strategy, as well as the associated potential for religious accommodation to become more politically
polarized than ever. The accommodation strategy, in tandem with an extremely aggressive interpretation of the Establishment Clause’s coverage,
has had the effect of valuing religion that is weak and unthreatening to
prevailing political and cultural mores, and disvaluing powerful, organized, and institutionally stable religion that offers substantial moral and
cultural challenges to the existing politico-cultural mores. Religious accommodation has been a needed, and welcome, approach to the problem of religious pluralism in America. But it has come with serious
costs—costs that have been borne over decades primarily by established
and longstanding religious traditions. Those costs show no signs of decreasing; to the contrary, they are likely to increase, and to result in further damage to religious accommodation, and to religious freedom more
broadly, in the years to come.

136

DeGirolami, supra note 106, at 108.

